"The radical conservatism of traditional masculinity makes it susceptible to extremist movements"

Lucas Gottzén is a professor in the Department of Child and Youth Studies at Stockholm University, Sweden. He takes feminist and critical perspectives on youth, gender and sexuality, with a special focus on young men and masculinities. His current research focuses primarily on sex and pleasure, consent and sexual violence, the "manosphere" (online men's rights activism), and far-right extremism. We talked to him ahead of the international conference Men in Movement, which will be held in Barcelona on 9 and 10 December 2024, with the title Masculinities for Feminist Futures: Challenging Masculinism and Violence. Organized by the Universitat Oberta de Catalunya (UOC), with the support of the Spanish National Pact against Gender-Based Violence and the Homes Igualataris association (HI/AHIGE), the aim of the symposium is to include men in the discussions around gender that are urgently needed to tackle violence and inequality.

In your work you've explored the connection between sexism and extremism. What features of traditional masculinities do you think make some men susceptible to extremist movements?

What we might call traditional masculinity, or traditional gender roles, can make men susceptible to extremist movements because they are inherently conservative. That's the main problem, really. They tend to look back, yearning for a "golden age" that probably never existed, when men were supreme and the patriarchy dominated. In that imagined past, men were "real men", women were "real women", and it was men who made the decisions both in the family and in public life. This connection is key. It is a world view that is fundamentally rooted in the past. And it's not conservative in the usual sense, where conservatism means a cautious approach to change. This is a kind of radical conservatism. We see it in far-right populism, or what some might call radical right-wing movements. For the far right, for example, this view is often tied to white supremacy: the idea of restoring white supremacy in society. Alongside this, it is also about restoring male supremacy.

How do far-right populist leaders use sexism to attract their followers, and how does this vary in different cultural and social contexts?

They use it in both an ideological and performative way. From an ideological perspective, these movements promote certain values, often rooted in binary thinking: men should be men and women should be women. They are usually anti-trans and oppose progressive ideas about gender, often pushing very conservative views of gender relations. But populist leaders also make sexism part of their performance, and how they do this can vary widely. Trump, for example, represents a very particular form of far-right populism that is based on extreme sexism, hatred, revenge and holding grudges against his political opponents. But this type of overtly aggressive and sexist machismo would not work in a Nordic context, for example, where far-right populism often includes what could be called "femonationalism". This positions women's rights as a core value of Western culture, in contrast to Muslim cultures. Leaders in these movements can't lean too much towards overt sexism because this would provoke a major backlash in places like Sweden or Finland. At the same time, they can't lean too much towards feminism, as this would undermine their traditionalist position. It is a delicate balancing act. Their leadership styles reflect these dynamics. In Western Europe, far-right leaders tend to present themselves as everyday people, a kind of traditional masculinity with a working-class or lower-middle-class aesthetic.

Another important aspect is the populist emphasis on strongman leadership. These leaders try to embody the idea of a strong state and strong leadership. They often present themselves as the only people capable of bringing about real change. This is not necessarily anti-democratic, but it can rest on notions with fascist overtones, placing a singular, powerful figure at the centre of the movement.

The rise of extremism is a cross-cutting issue right now, and globally important. Have you studied the social and political environments that are allowing these discourses to spread more easily and making people feel more drawn to extremism?

Yes, there are many reasons for this, although I can't speak entirely for the Global South, where things are a little different. But when it comes to Europe, North America and even my home country, Argentina, with figures like Milei, certain patterns emerge. The economic and political changes we have seen over the past thirty years have been key factors. Neoliberalism has dominated many countries, leading to economic austerity that has greatly affected the working and middle classes. Traditional working-class jobs, especially those held by men, have largely disappeared. Industries have moved out of countries such as Spain and Sweden, creating great anxiety and insecurity. In such situations, people often crave stability, while also looking for scapegoats.

Progressive movements and centre-left parties, such as the Social Democrats in Sweden and the Democrats in the United States, could have tackled these problems with policies to promote social justice and economic equality. But for the most part, they failed. On the one hand, their economic policies have continued to push neoliberalism, perpetuating the insecurity that people feel in their daily lives. On the other, they have increasingly focused on what some pejoratively call "identity politics". Let me be clear: I am not critical of LGBT rights, anti-racism or similar causes. But the intense focus on these issues is often perceived as elitist. It is not elitist, of course, but that's how it's seen, above all, by working-class men, who already feel they suffer from downward mobility and insecurity due to the instability of the labour market, mortgages and other pressures.

At the same time, these men see the rights of women, queer people and non-whites being strengthened, and associate this progress with left-wing or centre-left parties. This creates a feeling of alienation, especially among young men and lower-middle-class men, who then turn to populist and far-right parties.

The male vote is largely responsible for Trump's victory in the United States. We saw differences in gender-based voting patterns across all demographics in the American elections. Why was that?

I'm not an expert on American politics, but I think there are several factors at play. It was not only a decisive victory for Trump: we must also keep in mind that the results for Biden, and in particular Kamala Harris, were not as good as they could have been.

From a gender perspective, we cannot ignore the fact that Harris is a woman of colour. In the United States, it is still very hard for women to rise to positions of power, especially women of colour. There is a gender and racial aspect to how political leadership is perceived and accepted. Then there's Trump's personal style, which resonates strongly with certain groups of men. Not all of them, of course, but especially with men outside the country's metropolitan areas. His style is very different from the gender dynamics we see in European politics, where this kind of approach would not work in the same way.

Some studies show men are feeling extremely victimized and uncomfortable, even more so among the younger generations.

What's interesting is that, until maybe ten years ago, younger men tended to be more pro-feminist and supportive of women's rights and LGBTQ+ rights, while older men were more conservative. But this dynamic has changed. Part of this change is generational: young men then are now in their late 40s. They grew up in a different political and social landscape. But economic factors are also significant. EU-wide studies, for example, show that young men from areas with high unemployment rates are more likely to be critical of feminism. The researchers suggest that this stems from financial insecurity.

It's easier for someone like me, with a stable job and a secure position in the labour market, to feel generous or supportive of others. But for a 20-year-old who has just finished high school or university and has come up against a precarious labour market, this feeling of insecurity can amplify these attitudes. This means we are seeing greater gender polarization among young people compared to older generations.

Can these trends be tackled via a critical analysis of masculinities? What can we do to close this gap?

Yes, I think so. But the problem with much of the research into sexism regarding these issues is that it often begins by defining men, especially young men, as the problem. Their attitudes are considered inherently problematic, branded as sexist or hateful. And while there is some truth in that, I believe that if we want to drive change, we need to understand how these men see the world. This means adopting what an anthropologist might call an "emic perspective": understanding their struggles from their own point of view. What challenges do they face in everyday life? How do issues such as the sex or dating market, and job insecurity and economic instability shape their views and draw them, for example, to the manosphere? Democratic institutions – whether progressive, left-wing or centrist – must address the lived experiences of these young people. They face insecurity, austerity and instability. Political economy also plays an important role here. And we also need to reconsider our approach to identity politics. While important, focusing solely on identity can alienate these men, and seemingly reinforces male identity politics. Instead, we need universal approaches: solutions that apply to everyone and with demonstrable value for young people and white men. This doesn't mean diminishing the importance of feminist or LGBTQ+ movements; rather, we need to show how aligning with these movements can benefit everyone.

How do you imagine a future in which masculinities are decoupled from extremism and violence? What role do education and public policies play in this process?

The broader coupling of masculinity with violence needs to be dismantled, not only in relation to extremism, but also in areas such as domestic violence. This involves men learning, unlearning, and teaching each other how to build cultures where men are more supportive. This is probably the best way to put it: cultures that are not based on demonstrating masculinity through violence, aggression or oppression. Much of this can be addressed through educational programmes, such as violence prevention initiatives. A lot of good work is already being done in this area, and I think it's useful. But that's just one piece of the puzzle. The other part is to make people's lives liveable. It is vital we address the structural problems that make life precarious for so many. In short, it is not enough to focus just on changing norms and ideals. This is important, but we also need to tackle the material conditions and systemic challenges that people face. We have to do both.